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COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE WHOLE
QUESTION OF PEACE-KEEPING
OPERATIONS IN ALL THEIR ASPECTS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping

Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

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I. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM MEMBER STATES

AUSTRALIA

[Original: English]

[6 August 1993]

1. "An Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277-S/24111) points to the rapid evolution in the nature of peace-keeping operations in recent years. Mandates have become more complex and the size and make-up of peace-keeping forces as well as the number of operations in place at any one time are of a quite different order to that experienced for the first 40 years of the United Nations.

2. This expansion of peace-keeping and the diversification of peace-keepers' roles has occurred largely without debate or explicit consensus on the appropriate role for the United Nations and other bodies or on the desirable political and practical limits to peace-keeping.

3. Peace-keeping demands have outstripped the current planning and logistical capacity of the United Nations. They present Member States with increasing financial and human resource demands. It is widely recognized that the United Nations is overstretched, with a level of organization, resources and procedures no longer adequate to cope with the demands made of it.

4. There is, therefore, growing reason to agree on more predictable conditions for deploying peace-keeping operations and to define more clearly the realistic limits to what the United Nations can be expected to achieve.

5. The Government of Australia is currently developing its views on how these conditions could best be articulated. At the same time, it fully supports efforts to enhance the effectiveness of United Nations peace-keeping. It welcomes the recent reforms to strengthen the Secretariat's capacity for planning, logistics and command and control of peace-keeping. Australia will continue to play an active role in discussion and development of proposals by Member States in consultation with the Secretary-General on practical steps to improve the effectiveness of peace-keeping.

FRANCE

[Original: French]

[28 July 1993]

1. France has taken note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General dated 15 June 1993 (S/25944) on implementation of the recommendations contained in "An Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277-S/24111). It is pleased at the measures already taken.

2. In accordance with the wishes expressed by the Secretary-General, the French Government wishes to contribute to the thinking on the subject and to communicate its views as follows:

I. ENHANCED PREPARATION OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

Strengthening of the Secretariat

3. France welcomes the substantial increase in staff and the enhancement of the infrastructures of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations. Such efforts should be continued in both the civilian and military divisions of that Department. Such enhancement, which is a universally recognized imperative, is essential in order to respond to the continual increase in peace-keeping operations, which require constant political and military follow-up.

4. Similarly, the French Government gives its unreserved approval to the dispatch by the Secretary-General of fact-finding missions to areas where the international Organization is, or may be, called upon to intervene. As underscored by the Secretary-General in his report of 15 June 1993, the mass of information collected by those missions, or communicated by Member States, should be dealt with efficiently. For that reason, it also appears indispensable to continue to strengthen the resources of the Secretariat, in particular the Military Adviser's Office and the situation room of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations.

Improved military planning

5. The function of military planning is today as crucial as political follow-up on the various conflicts in existence. The United Nations is being induced to deploy peace-keeping missions in which countries with diverse military traditions participate. It must therefore have more effective monitoring - and eventually planning - structures in order to anticipate crisis situations, to react rapidly and to facilitate initial planning of operations in accordance with the very specific constraints of the United Nations.

6. Efforts should be exerted along three specific lines:

(a) Even before the Member States make their contributions known, an initial operational concept should be drawn up on the basis of an enhanced military audit and, eventually, of a planning outline, in collaboration with the competent special representative of the Secretary-General. This should make it possible to improve the quality and reliability of the implementation plan for the military aspect of the mandate, which is usually described in the report of the Secretary-General setting the scope of action for each mission. That is why there should be a gradual establishment of a new structure attached to the Secretariat and made up of officers with sound planning experience. That structure should be of a size that is compatible with the flexibility expected of it;

(b) As soon as the principle of a deployment is established, the structure should be strengthened as soon as possible by representatives of the contributing States who are entrusted with the preparation of operational

planning as such, in liaison with the military staff to be deployed on the ground;

(c) Furthermore, global planning cells already exist in a number of multilateral, political and military organizations, in particular in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Western European Union. Contacts and exchanges of views between the United Nations and those organizations, whose experience and skills are widely recognized, are necessary and should be developed, in particular for the operation zones covered by those organizations, and in the event that they should be called upon to intervene directly at the request of the United Nations. Such exchanges should allow the emergence of complementarity, which may prove indispensable if and when the experts and troops of those organizations find themselves working side by side with the United Nations on the ground.

Greater efforts in the direction of contributing countries

7. The major troop-contributing countries have regularly expressed their desire to be informed, in the course of a mission, of the general directions and operational decisions taken. The French Government understands those requests and feels that it would be useful for an informal follow-up committee, comprising diplomatic and military representatives of the countries participating in the mission in question, to be very regularly informed and, where necessary, consulted by the Department of Peace-keeping Operations regarding the decisions taken or under consideration. In short, if it is necessary to enhance the Secretariat's capacity for analysis, planning and follow-up, it is logical that the contributing countries should also be collectively better informed of the progress of the mission.

Better logistics

8. The United Nations is increasingly being called upon by the international community to intervene very rapidly in situations of crisis or humanitarian emergency. This increased responsibility means that the reaction time of the Organization should be correspondingly swifter. Such a requirement presupposes that the Organization should at all times have at its disposal the necessary equipment for the speedy organization of a mission. That is why it appears necessary to strengthen the logistic potential of the United Nations.

9. The stocking of arms and ammunition requires costly maintenance and the availability of qualified personnel who are familiar with the equipment they are handling. For such reasons in particular, it is preferable that, in general, military equipment should remain under the exclusive responsibility of the Member States.

10. However, recent experience shows that certain needs are constant from one mission to another. Peace-keeping involves the use of certain very specific types of equipment with which the contingents called upon to serve as "blue helmets" are not systematically supplied and which are liable to be used in extremely diverse theatres of operations. That is true of both non-military equipment (prefabricated buildings, radios, telephones, vehicles, ...) and of certain military equipment (military communications, advance armoured vehicles, drones ...). The Secretariat must be in a position to provide civilian and

military personnel, as soon as they are deployed, with this type of equipment, which is indispensable for the execution of their mandate. Plans should therefore be made for the Secretariat to acquire a small central stock of equipment specifically dedicated to peace-keeping.

II. ENHANCED ON-THE-GROUND OPERATION OF PEACE-KEEPING MISSIONS

Military contribution of Member States

11. In the light of the increasing need for United Nations interventions, a thoroughgoing reform of the "blue helmets" mobilization system is necessary. Since it is clear that the Organization cannot today afford to maintain a standing force, it is indispensable for the Member States to establish forces which can be mobilized rapidly. These should be made up of already earmarked units forming a set of military modules to be trained with peace-keeping tasks in mind and supplied with equipment which is compatible among the various units. These units (military modules) would be placed at the disposal of the United Nations and could be mobilized at any time.

12. In view of the increasing number of peace-keeping operations, the current limits to the capacity of the major contributing countries have been reached. States are now compelled, more than in the past, to become involved primarily in accordance with their own national interests. By the same token, it also happens that contributing countries show a lack of enthusiasm for intervention within the sole framework of what is today conventionally known as the "moral obligation" of the members of the international community.

13. The mechanism of military modules should make it possible, to a large extent, to correct the current tendencies, to get back to the Organization's principle of neutrality and, through prior consultations, to help the Secretary-General to assess the true capacity of the Organization for intervention. It should also make it possible to involve a greater number of Member States in peace-keeping missions. It is to be hoped that each Member State should feel itself concerned by this approach and should identify, in accordance with its own capacity, what types of units it might be able to place at the disposal of the Organization. Eventually, each Member State should participate in this process.

Enhanced operational intermeshing

14. The logistical organization of such modules means that all the contingents called upon to be operational at very short notice should have a common base of know-how and methods. It therefore appears necessary to introduce training for all of the units concerned. Such training, which would be supplementary to the military training of each army, should be given initially in the national military schools. However, the United Nations should coordinate, first at the level of high-ranking officers, and going progressively down the hierarchy, specific training courses which would allow concepts and methods to be exchanged. Such courses should be organized in turn by the major contributing countries under United Nations control. Furthermore, joint (staff) exercises should be progressively organized by the United Nations in order to test under

realistic conditions the operational intermeshing of the contingents and to suggest concrete ways of enhancing it.

Enhancement of tools of political analysis and follow-up of missions

15. The mandates of the missions deployed recently contain increasingly broad political aspects. The missions are now regularly being asked to monitor the administrations in place, to train new police forces, to forge the various previously rival factions into new armies, to ensure the fairness of electoral campaigns, etc. Such tasks are wholly in response to the concern voiced by all to have peace-keeping missions also deal with the political origin of the conflicts in order to allow sustainable peacemaking.

16. This new responsibility means that the mission entrusted with such peacemaking should constantly be alert to the changing political positions of all the parties to the conflict. It is all the more important to be well acquainted with the local political situation, as the peace-keeping missions - usually involving tens of thousands of men - are likely to stir up a feeling of resentment among segments of the population, sometimes manipulated by a minority opposed to the mission. Any mission must be able to anticipate the problems it is likely to encounter and to explain to the populations concerned the rationale behind its decisions.

17. This is why it would be desirable for each mission always to have a policy-analysis unit under the direct authority of the office of the special representative. The role of this unit, composed of international specialists and experts from the region, would be to closely monitor and analyse developments in the political climate and in the opinions of local parties in order to inform the special representative of the trends of opinion among the rulers and the population. The political analyses carried out by this unit should also be transmitted to the Secretariat for its information.

III. GREATER POLICY CONTROL

18. France is firmly in favour of enhanced policy control over peace-keeping operations.

19. There should be closer monitoring of the various phases of such operations.

20. Operations must be prepared along the lines of the policy guidelines proposed by the Secretary-General in "An Agenda for Peace".

21. Apart from fully addressing the general desire for the development of preventive diplomacy, the dispatch of fact-finding missions involving representatives of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations would help to pave the way for the deployment of troops, identify needs, gather information and prepare cost estimates for the operations. The reports of these missions should be transmitted to Member States as soon as possible to enable them to make early arrangements for their possible participation in such missions.

22. The practice whereby a special representative of the Secretary-General is appointed for each mission should be institutionalized. The Special

Representative should be appointed after consultations with the parties to the conflict and the Security Council. His role is to coordinate the activities of the various components of the operation (civilian, military, humanitarian ...), monitor the policy - and not the operational - aspects of military issues, and to report regularly on his mission to the Secretary-General and the Security Council.

23. The establishment of the operation must depend on the definition of a clear mandate by the Security Council. In this regard, France would like the resolutions authorizing the establishment of peace-keeping forces to be as specific as possible on two points:

(a) The final political objectives of the force must be spelled out in the mandate. In order to be realistic, such objectives could be limited and need not necessarily aim at a complete settlement of the crisis;

(b) The mandate should also include specific intermediate objectives. The Secretary-General should be able to propose an evaluation timetable in the report he submits to the Security Council when each operation is established. Such intermediate objectives could include: the partial or total disarmament of the belligerents, the establishment and observance of a cease-fire, and the dispatch of good-offices missions to the areas in conflict.

24. The management and monitoring of the operation could be improved:

(a) By developing the still too-limited resources of the situation room of the Field Operations Division. This room should be accessible not only to members of the Division but also to the military representatives of the troop-contributing States and even members of the Military Staff Committee established by virtue of Article 47 of the Charter;

(b) By having the special representative of the Secretary-General report regularly (once a month) on his mission as a whole, the progress of operations, problems encountered in the implementation of his mandate and observance of the timetable. The work of the policy-analysis unit of the mission should be reported to the Security Council, which should also be provided with any other pieces of information (internal audits) that it might find useful;

(c) By institutionalizing the dispatch of inspection missions composed of experts with a mandate to report back to the Security Council so as to enable it to assess the situation, verify that the resources of the force are commensurate with its mandate and also verify compliance with and a uniform interpretation of the rules of engagement.

25. The involvement of regional arrangements and organizations in peace-keeping operations should be encouraged under certain conditions:

(a) The special representative of the Secretary-General must be in charge of the operation. The representatives of regional arrangements and organizations must be under his command;

(b) The policy of appointing a joint representative of the United Nations and of a regional organization may also be encouraged;

(c) When the States members of these regional arrangements and organizations participate in an operation, their representatives should also be granted access to the situation room of the Secretariat.

IV. BETTER FINANCIAL SUPERVISION

Firmly established principles

26. The question of financing peace-keeping operations should be monitored closely and the French Government:

(a) Wishes to reiterate its commitment to the current system of establishing a specific budget for each operation, which ensures financial transparency of the operations and allows individual monitoring by Member States;

(b) Still favours the financing of operations through assessed contributions as the only way of ensuring the independence of such operations and providing them with sustained resources. Voluntary contributions should be accepted only from beneficiary States and only when such States have the financial capacity to make such contributions;

(c) Would like detailed cost estimates to be prepared before every mission and a financial report to be sent to Member States before any decision is taken by the Security Council;

(d) Will support any proposal aimed at conducting audits of ongoing operations or, generally speaking, at ensuring a more regular supervision of expenditures and provision of more comprehensive information to the oversight bodies (the Security Council and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions).

An informal consultation group

27. The difficult, complex and long missions that the United Nations has recently put into place throughout the world have highlighted some of the problems facing troop-contributing countries. Countries with special responsibilities due to the extent of their involvement in peace-keeping missions should hold close informal consultations among themselves in order to address those crucial problems. We believe that such an informal consultation group should give priority attention to two topics which are unanimously recognized as important and are dictated by current events:

(a) The approaches to the financing of peace-keeping missions outlined in the Volcker-Ogata report (A/48/460, annex), which should be developed further with a view to their prompt implementation;

(b) The safety of personnel engaged under the United Nations banner and the types of sanctions that could be taken against those responsible for attacks against such personnel.

28. This consultation group, which must remain informal and flexible, could transmit the outcome of its discussions to the Secretariat, the Security Council and the General Assembly.

NAMIBIA

[Original: English]

[3 August 1993]

1. The policy of the Government of the Republic of Namibia with regard to international peace-keeping has, naturally, been influenced by the recent history of the country. The successful United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) operation in 1989-1990, which assisted in ushering in the independence of Namibia, was witnessed and enthusiastically supported by the entire Namibian population, as they saw peace and security being restored. UNTAG became synonymous with freedom.

2. The Government of the Republic of Namibia has made peace and stability the main platform of its domestic, as well as foreign policies, and by its policy of national reconciliation, peace and stability have grown and found deep roots in Namibia, particularly as nurtured by the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia.

3. The policy of international peace-keeping is thus one of the pillars of the foreign policy of the Government of Namibia. Given the manpower and resources constraint, Namibia will, to the extent of its capabilities, play its role in peace-keeping and peace-building.

4. From this perspective, the Government of the Republic of Namibia would support measures that would help to create regional confidence and trust and dispel any suspicion and mistrust. The Regional Meeting on Confidence and Security-Building Measures in Southern Africa, held at Windhoek from 24 to 26 February 1993, provided a useful opportunity for regional leaders and policy makers in matters of national security to discuss issues common to the region; and, more importantly, to dispel any mistrust and misconception about one another. The Government would encourage and support similar meetings in the future, or follow-up on the achievement of the Windhoek meeting.

5. In the light of this policy, the Government of the Republic of Namibia has spared no efforts to find a solution to the crisis in neighbouring Angola. At the regional level, as well as the international, Ministers of the Government have incessantly sought to find ways and means to resolve the crisis. The Government of the Republic of Namibia thus actively pursues a policy of preventive diplomacy and peaceful settlement of disputes consistent with the Constitution.

6. In the current peace-keeping operation in Cambodia, under the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Namibia has a contingent of reinforced vehicles - Wolf - participating in that operation. Following the experience of this specialized contingent of reinforced vehicles, Namibia will,

in the future, consider seriously, if requested, participation in peace-keeping operations with a similar contingent, tempered only by financial constraints.

7. Namibia would like to emphasize the significance for countries that cannot afford the specialized training required to be given the necessary assistance to bring their forces to the level required for effective participation in international peace-keeping operations. This is particularly pertinent to a young and developing country like Namibia. The reinforced vehicles - Wolf - need maintenance. In the operation in Cambodia, the request by the United Nations was made at the last minute. As a result, only those vehicles which were in operational capacity could be dispatched, perhaps with some deficiencies that could have been rectified.

8. The Government of the Republic of Namibia considers that financing of peace-keeping operations is the collective responsibility of all Member States, in accordance with the provision of the Charter of the United Nations. The Government has always paid its assessed contributions in full and on time. However, it should be noted that, with increasing peace-keeping operations, financing of such peace-keeping operations will become a heavy burden to developing countries such as Namibia. The Government would thus wish to point out that moving Namibia up from Category D to C, as proposed in the report of the Secretary-General (A/47/484), will increase its peace-keeping operations by 100 per cent. The proposal, which is meant to reserve the last Category - D - for the least developed countries, would nevertheless result in imposing a heavy burden on developing countries such as Namibia.

9. The recommendation in the Ogata-Volcker report (A/48/460, annex, p. 18) to create a revolving fund at the level of $400 million will improve the start-up cost of peace-keeping operations as compared to the current level of $150 million; this recommendation should be considered.

QATAR

[Original: Arabic]

[2 August 1993]

1. The Government of Qatar affirms the importance of peace-keeping and peace-enforcement machinery in accordance with the relevant articles of the Charter. It also agrees with the Secretary-General concerning the importance of preventive diplomacy to avert the outbreak of armed conflict that threatens international peace and security.

2. The Government of Qatar also endorses the Secretary-General's proposals contained in paragraphs 34 to 44 of his report entitled "An Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277-S/24111), in particular the use of peace-enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances. Such forces should be more heavily armed than peace-keeping forces and available on a permanent basis for the purposes laid down in Article 42 of the Charter.

3. The Government of Qatar believes that the proposals submitted by the Secretary-General in his above-mentioned report for the financing of peace-

keeping and peace-enforcement operations are worthy of consideration and merit endorsement.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

[Original: Russian]

[14 September 1993]

1. The profound changes that have taken place in the world over the last few years have also changed the nature of the challenges faced by international peace and security. The primary threat to humankind is now posed not by the possibility of the eruption of a nuclear conflict between the major Powers, but by regional crises of a national, ethnic or religious nature.

2. The priorities of the international community in the area of security are also undergoing corresponding changes. The attention of most States is now focused on peace-keeping efforts, and a corresponding need has arisen to strengthen the peacemaking capacity of the United Nations.

3. The Russian Federation is pleased to note that over the last few years the United Nations, despite all the difficulties in its path, has made considerable progress in adapting its peacemaking activities to the changing conditions. The relevant facts and trends are well known and there is no need to mention them here.

4. At the same time, certain new problems have emerged. While increasingly pinning their hopes on the peacemaking efforts of the United Nations, States are often reluctant to support those hopes with any practical contribution and to commit the necessary material, technical and financial resources and manpower. At times they even appear impatient and critical, when peacemaking actions by the United Nations become stalled or fail to bring immediate and conspicuous results. Global security and the very future of the United Nations will depend in large measure on the extent to which the Organization is able to adapt in a smooth and efficient manner to the realities of the changed world.

5. The report by the Secretary-General entitled "An Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277-S/24111) has significantly advanced the concept of peacemaking. The detailed discussion of that document in the Security Council demonstrated the urgent need to implement the provisions it contained and to define the common priorities of the States Members of the United Nations.

6. A substantive discussion, centred on "An Agenda for Peace", has also begun in the General Assembly, and its results are awaited with interest.

7. In this context, the Russian Federation fully supports the recommendation of the Security Council that all States should consider participation in and support for international peace-keeping as part of their foreign and national security policy. This fundamental principle is reflected in the theoretical foreign policy documents and regulatory instruments of the Russian Federation currently being elaborated.

8. The provisions contained in the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 28 May 1993 (S/25859) are intended to help clarify and develop the general political orientation and operational principles underlying the conduct of United Nations peace-keeping operations. A useful contribution to the determination of the basis on which peace-keeping operations are to be conducted has also been made by the document prepared by the special group of experts on peace-keeping cooperation established by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In our view, the provisions of that document could be taken into account in the preparation of a report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

9. The effectiveness of the United Nations peace-keeping operations could be considerably enhanced by making more active and comprehensive use of the resources offered by preventive diplomacy. Among the new aspects of this activity, the Russian Federation welcomes the first preventive deployment of a United Nations contingent in Macedonia as an important step forward in the search for new approaches in the area of conflict prevention. The further development of the concept of "safe zones" could also be of value.

10. The Russian Federation is prepared to assist in providing the Secretary-General with essential information, including information of a confidential nature, to ensure effective preventive diplomacy and peace-keeping activities as a whole.

11. The Russian Federation supports the idea that the Security Council should make full use of its powers under the Charter to steer conflicting parties in the direction of negotiated political settlement. It welcomes the vigorous and purposeful efforts made by the Secretary-General in recent months to exercise his prerogatives in the area of mediation and good offices, and believes that the close and regular consultations he has held at the same time with the Security Council are of exceptional importance for the elaboration of a common strategy.

12. The Russian Federation sets high store by the elaboration, at the earliest possible opportunity, of specific arrangements for the implementation of the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations. In particular, it would be a good idea to consolidate the practice whereby the Security Council recommends to the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the other multilateral financial institutions that they take due account of the hardship caused to "third countries" by sanctions, when funds are being allocated to such countries through those organizations.

13. The experience of recent United Nations peace-keeping operations, in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia and Somalia, demonstrates the importance of a smoothly operating functional chain between the planning, preparation, logistic support and monitoring of the conduct of United Nations peace-keeping operations. This, in turn, presupposes a clearly defined interface between national contingents, the proper organization of the command system and the elaboration of precise rules governing the conduct of operations and criteria for the use of force. It goes without saying that peace-keeping operations with "difficult mandates" require a special approach, applicable also to the selection of United Nations peace-keeping contingents (taking due account

of their experience and combat efficiency) and to the appropriateness of enforcement measures, and so on.

14. It is vitally important that operations should be launched in the context of clearly defined political settlement objectives, and not merely as a response by the international community to situations where "something should be done".

15. A component vital to the success of peace-keeping activities is a sound financial basis. The current crisis in this area is due, first and foremost, to a lack of political will on the part of States to support international stability through United Nations peace-keeping efforts, as evidenced, in particular, by the fact (cited in the Volcker-Ogata report (A/48/460, annex)) that, on average, for every thousand dollars spent by States on defence, only one and a half dollars are contributed to United Nations peace-keeping efforts.

16. Attention should be focused on devising arrangements for the more rigorous monitoring of the planning and rational utilization of human, material and technical resources in United Nations operations. In particular, the role of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions could be strengthened at all stages of the preparation and implementation of United Nations operating budgets.

17. Attention should also be given to the question of financial support for the initial stage of an operation in the event of emergency deployment. The Russian Federation is prepared to support the proposal by the Secretary-General that arrangements should be worked out to accelerate the allocation of resources to a new operation, immediately it has been instituted by the Security Council.

18. The Russian Federation still has doubts regarding the creation of a single budget for all operations, since this would leave unsolved the primary problem of the need to regulate expenditure and to enhance the effectiveness of operations, and would not improve the cash-flow situation.

19. The Russian Federation believes that it is high time to consider diversifying the sources of financing for peace-keeping operations through the increased material responsibility of recipient States and other States directly interested in ending the conflict. It might be useful to secure resources from regional organizations, voluntary contributions, including voluntary contributions from non-governmental sources and, in specific cases, make use of contributions in kind.

20. The time has come to take specific steps to review the scale of assessments to the budget of United Nations operations.

21. The following ways of improving United Nations peacemaking mechanisms are particularly timely in the light of the Organization's present tasks:

(a) The existing structures involved in the planning, preparation and management of United Nations operations must be strengthened and, perhaps, additional structures should be created. Under the Charter of the United Nations, the Military Staff Committee is responsible for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. The revitalization of the Committee merits serious study. If the Committee were

able to focus on specific actions and include in its work representatives of the countries that are the principal suppliers of contingents (for example, in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter), it would then be able, under the direction of the Security Council, to assume general command of operations, develop specific proposals on cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in a given field, and so forth. The division of tasks among Secretariat units must be more clearly defined. The Russian Federation considers that it is important to strengthen the central position of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations and include, within its core staff, qualified specialists with a broad range of functions, who could be involved in a variety of ways in the urgent launching of operations;

(b) Serious consideration should be given to the command and monitoring of field operations. Effective leadership by the commander of United Nations forces, close coordination of the activities of contingents from various countries and their adherence to the mandate given to the Security Council are of key importance. To this end, it is important to have well-defined interrelations and cooperation within the command of the operations (including their military and civilian components) and a single operational centre that functions efficiently 24 hours a day;

(c) The Russian Federation welcomed the ideas underlying the concept of United Nations "reserve forces" proposed by the Secretary-General. The Supreme Council is currently considering draft legislation on the participation of the Russian Federation in United Nations peace-keeping operations. When it is adopted the Russian Federation intends to hold negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement with the United Nations on the provision of Russian military, civilian and auxiliary personnel, who are in a state of readiness, and material and technical resources and services for already established or planned peace-keeping operations. The Russian Federation has already informed the United Nations about a part of its existing resources (two army medical divisions);

(d) It is crucially important to ensure that operations are launched as quickly as possible, when fragile agreements in "hot spots" can and should be strengthened by a United Nations presence, which should begin with the sending of observers. The time between the Security Council's adoption of a decision and the actual start of operations should be shortened considerably;

(e) In taking a decision on the start-up of an operation, in particular a large-scale operation, the Security Council should consider not only political expediency, the cost of the United Nations action and the degree of potential hazards of personnel but also the problem of "withdrawing" from the operation. There should be no "limitless involvement". However, this principle should not be adhered to slavishly. In exceptional cases, in the absence of a viable political settlement, the States Members of the United Nations should agree to extend the operation, since "a bad peace is better than a good quarrel". The practice of including in Security Council decisions provisions that make the presence of United Nations personnel in conflict areas contingent on progress towards a political settlement should be more widely applied;

(f) Extremely pressing is the need to improve procedures for recruiting and training personnel, including civilian personnel. In particular, the

criteria for recruiting civilian personnel should be more precise and recommendations on the training of such staff to carry out United Nations operations should be standardized. It would be useful to establish national "reserve contingents" of volunteer civilian specialists. The Russian Federation considers it advisable for the United Nations Secretariat to compile and send to potential donor countries an illustrative list of specialities and requirements to be met by candidates.

22. Lately, the question of safety of personnel has become particularly acute. In this regard, the Russian Federation is in favour of the most resolute measures, including measures to bring to justice persons and organizations guilty of attacks on and other acts of violence against the "blue berets". The mandatory conclusion of agreements with recipient countries on the status of United Nations forces is a partial solution to the problem but does not provide an adequate answer to all questions. At the same time, vigorous measures to defend United Nations contingents should not develop into military operations of a punitive nature or lead to the involvement of the United Nations in internal conflicts.

23. The right of the United Nations to bring to justice persons who resort to force against United Nations personnel must be made legally binding. A precedent for this might arise when the International Court of Justice begins its proceedings on the former Yugoslavia.

24. Post-conflict peace-building is becoming an inalienable part of peace-keeping, without which countries emerging from the "active" stage of a conflict cannot be rebuilt. The Russian Federation would be particularly interested in a study of the experience and capabilities of the United Nations and other international organizations in this area with respect to peace-building in the territory of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

25. The Russian Federation considers useful the proposals to decentralize responsibility for peace-keeping and peacemaking and supports the idea of enhancing the role of regional organizations in this area in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. Progress in this direction should be gradual, and an indispensable condition should be that the Security Council bears the principal responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.

26. The Russian Federation welcomes the conclusion between the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of a framework agreement on cooperation and coordination and takes note of the efforts of CSCE, the European Community, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Western European Union to settle the conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia on the basis of Security Council decisions and under the Council's political guidance.

27. The question of peacemaking in the territory of the former USSR is extremely important to us. The collective peacemaking mechanisms of the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as individual regional agreements on the settlement of conflicts in particular regions of the former USSR, are currently being more actively applied in practice and the cooperation between

such mechanisms and the United Nations and CSCE is increasing. As a member of those mechanisms and agreements, the Russian Federation appreciates the practical contribution of the United Nations to the settlement of these conflicts, and is prepared to cooperate further with it.

SWEDEN*

[Original: English]

[20 August 1993]

Ongoing efforts

1. The Nordic countries welcome and support the ongoing efforts to restructure the Department of Peace-keeping Operations aimed at strengthening the capacity of the United Nations in the field of peace-keeping.

2. They especially welcome the integration of relevant parts of the Field Operations Division into the Department of Peace-keeping Operations as a step they believe will strengthen and make more effective the planning, management and administration support to the operations.

3. They look forward to the result of the work of the stand-by planning team aimed at improving and speeding up the process by which the Organization obtains personnel or formed units and equipment from Member States for new peace-keeping operations or the expansion of existing ones.

4. They are prepared to cooperate with the Secretariat, to the extent that resources so permit, and to find additional personnel for specific tasks in the peace-keeping field that may be provided to the United Nations on a temporary basis.

5. The Nordic countries welcome the creation of a situation room for the operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, and commend the intention of the Secretary-General to take steps towards the establishment of an integrated situation room, covering peace-keeping operations world wide. A significant strengthening of the capabilities of the United Nations Secretariat for the operational management, command and control of ongoing operations is now needed.

6. They furthermore consider the creation of a military planning cell within the Department of Peace-keeping Operations an essential and timely measure for enhancing the capacity of the Secretariat.

7. In addition to the measures that are already under way, the Nordic countries would however suggest that the following proposals be considered with a view to taking action on them within a near future.

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* On behalf of the Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

Organization and effectiveness

8. The arrangements for training of peace-keeping personnel - military, civilian and police - should be reviewed and improved, using the appropriate capabilities of Member States, regional organizations and arrangements, non-governmental organizations and the Secretariat. In particular, consideration should be given to the establishment of a training programme for key personnel of peace-keeping operations with a view to creating a pool of trained personnel with knowledge of the United Nations system and its working procedures. The Nordic countries are prepared to explore ways and means to strengthen their cooperation with the United Nations and its Member States in this field.

9. Core staff of a peace-keeping operation should be included in the planning process at an early stage. One guiding principle for this process should be that, to the extent possible, the persons who are to implement a peace-keeping operation should also be involved in its planning. This will require increased efforts by the Secretariat to identify, in cooperation with Member States, at an early stage potential key personnel, such as force commanders and chief administrative officers, for future peace-keeping operations.

10. Descriptions of the areas of responsibility for the different experts and advisers, as well as the regular desk officers, within the Department of Peace-keeping Operations should, as appropriate, be provided to Member States, thus facilitating communications and cooperation between all parties involved.

Financing

11. The serious financial situation of United Nations peace-keeping operations is of major concern to the Nordic countries. Action must be taken, bearing in mind the useful proposals in the Volcker-Ogata report (A/48/460, annex) to ensure adequate financing of the peace-keeping operations, based on the principle of collective responsibility and the payment of assessed contributions in full and on time. In this connection, the Nordic countries stress the importance of reimbursing all the outstanding dues of troop-contributing countries without delay.

12. While welcoming the establishment of the Peace-keeping Reserve Fund, the Nordic countries underline the need for further discussions on how to achieve adequate financing of the initial phase of peace-keeping operations.

13. The Nordic countries suggest that steps be taken to enable the delegation of increased financial and administrative authority to the force commander or the special representative for a multi-component mission, as a way of enhancing the performance of the mission and achieving greater cost-efficiency. For this purpose, the existing United Nations Financial Regulations and Rules, as well as the administrative procedures for peace-keeping operations, need to be reviewed in order to increase the capacity of missions to adjust flexibly to new situations and specific requirements. Such measures must however be matched by efforts to provide adequate training to administrative personnel in the field, as well as strengthened internal control procedures.

Agreements and guidelines

14. The conclusion of status-of-forces agreements is essential for the creation of a well-defined working relationship between the United Nations and the host country for a peace-keeping operation. Increased efforts by the Secretariat to finalize such agreements, preferably before the deployment of a peace-keeping force, are therefore required.

15. The Nordic countries would also like to underline the crucial importance of the model agreement between the United Nations and Member States contributing personnel and equipment to peace-keeping operations, especially as these operations become increasingly complex. The Secretariat is urged to conclude such agreements with contributing Member States.

THAILAND

[Original: English]

[21 July 1993]

I. ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. The Royal Thai Government concurs with the Secretary-General's observation that "the foundation-stone of the work of the United Nations is and must remain the State". Respect for sovereignty and integrity of States is therefore vital in any common international and United Nations undertaking.

2. The Royal Thai Government is following with great interest the development in peace-enforcement activities by the United Nations. Since peace-enforcement activities entail substantial new risks, the Royal Thai Government feels that the advantages and disadvantages of each United Nations peace-enforcement activity must be thoroughly considered. In some situations, such activities may be counterproductive, especially when consent has not been obtained from all the parties involved in the conflict.

3. The Secretary-General's suggestion that United Nations peace-keepers be sent to "zones of instability and potential crisis" to prevent any outbreak of hostilities also requires further careful consideration. The Royal Thai Government feels that greater clarity regarding the scope and the circumstances under which it might take place is needed.

II. ON THE CAPACITY OF THE SECRETARIAT

4. The Royal Thai Government welcomes the recent expansion of the Office of the Military Adviser. It also fully supports the suggestion that Field Operations Division be integrated within the Department of Peace-keeping Operations.

III. ON PLANNING

5. It is well recognized that planning procedures need to be improved. The Royal Thai Government feels that force commanders should be appointed early and be directly engaged in preliminary planning so that early advice concerning force composition and requirements can be given to ensure effective preparation by troop-contributing countries. Moreover, procurement and logistics procedures must also be improved.

IV. ON COMMAND AND CONTROL

6. The rapid expansion of peace-keeping activities has created an urgent need for a fully functional situation room/operations centre at United Nations Headquarters. The Royal Thai Government shares the view that, as a minimum requirement, such a centre must serve as a single focal point for communications and information about peace-keeping operations. In the long-run, it may serve to integrate the operational, logistics, planning and intelligence requirements of such operations.

V. ON TRAINING

7. The Royal Thai Government believes that much of the success of all peace-keeping activities depends on well-trained personnel. It is self-evident that training should be based on agreed standards and concepts of operations. The effort to prepare a comprehensive United Nations manual on logistics policies and procedures is most welcome. Moreover, the feasibility of setting up regional training centres should be seriously studied. This is because regional cooperation in sharing experiences could enhance Member States' capability and preparedness to contribute to peace-keeping operations.

VI. ON FINANCE

8. The Royal Thai Government has long been seriously concerned about the precarious situation regarding the financing of peace-keeping operations. It is our firm belief that the United Nations peace-keeping efforts are too vital to the maintenance of world peace to remain hostage to financial and budgetary restrictions. The key to solving this intractable problem, in its view, still lies in Member States paying their assessed contribution in full and on time. However, other bold and innovative approaches suggested by the Secretary-General in "An Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277-S/24111) should be seriously pursued.

VII. ON SAFETY OF PERSONNEL

9. As a troop-contributing country, Thailand is gravely concerned with the growing number of fatalities among peace-keeping and other personnel. The Royal Thai Government hopes that measures recommended by the General Assembly in its resolution 47/72 of 14 December 1992 will be implemented in a timely manner.

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

[Original: English]

[20 July 1993]

1. In response to the Security Council statement of 28 May 1993 (S/25859) on the follow-up to the "Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277-S/24111), the United Nations Secretary-General requested Member States to identify to him those areas of United Nations peace-keeping operations which required strengthening, and their ideas for positive steps that could be taken.

General

2. The Security Council and the United Nations Secretariat need to analyse the situation on the ground carefully before agreeing to establish a United Nations peace-keeping operation. Such operations need clear and achievable objectives linked to an ongoing political process that can provide a solution, and a precise mandate as well as the consent of the parties and confidence that the necessary resources will be made available. The United Nations and Security Council must also be clear-sighted on the possible wish of regional organizations/Member States to pass on to the United Nations operations where their own actions have not brought a solution and consider whether the United Nations should be involved. There is also a need for the United Nations to look at existing mandates critically to see what impetus can be given to bring them towards an end.

3. The British Government welcomes the considerable efforts already made by the Secretary-General to strengthen and enhance the United Nations capability to plan and conduct peace-keeping operations. Useful initiatives have been taken, in particular the strengthening of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, the establishment of a 24-hour situation room and the initiative of the stand-by force planning project. The United Kingdom welcomes proposals to integrate the Field Operations Division with the Department of Peace-keeping Operations.

Command, control and planning

4. Command and control relationships need to be more clearly defined. Unity of command at the highest levels is essential. Such unity of command is unlikely to be achieved until all aspects of a peace-keeping operations are handled by a single department at United Nations Headquarters.

5. The actual command function (that is, the authority to assign force elements to tasks and to reassign them as necessary) should remain the responsibility of the force commander. The United Nations Headquarters should be responsible for providing direction to commanders and acting as the essential political/military interface. It should focus on strategic rather than detailed operational planning and needs improved capability in this area.

6. The ability to react flexibility to dynamic situations required to meet the demands of peace-keeping is a product of three main factors: capacity, expertise and experience. Economy of effort is also required, not only to reduce costs but to ensure that a surge capability exists and to make sure that

scarce resources are husbanded wisely. The United Kingdom believes that these four principles could best be applied to the Secretariat through the establishment of an expanded planning and operations staff - a general staff for peace-keeping. These men and women, both civilian and military, some of whom might be seconded from nations, would work to an agreed professional doctrine and would be able to provide the necessary core of the United Nations strategic planning chain principally at United Nations Headquarters in New York but also in the field. They would augment the existing embryonic planning and operations cell and provide the capacity, expertise and experience it will require if it is to be effective. Such staff should work to agreed standards with clear performance goals. Further elaboration of the tasks of the planning and operations staff is contained in the annex.

7. The planning and operations staff would provide the United Nations with the "nervous system" for which its present staff is neither structured nor resourced. They would not have a command function but would hold responsibility for the initial development of an operational plan until such time as the force commander and his staff were appointed. It is important that a force commander should be associated with planning from the outset. Members of the planning and operations staff might also deploy to operations as principal staff officers to United Nations commanders. However, a balance would need to be struck between the needs in the field and the needs at headquarters in New York. Great care would have to be taken not to dilute the central core of expertise to the extent that it became ineffective. In preparing an operational plan, due regard must be paid to potential costs to ensure that expenditure does not exceed what is essential to carry out tasks effectively.

8. There is also a need to examine the best means of drawing in staff used to working together to form the nucleus of a headquarters when deploying a new mission. States might be asked to nominate officers who could be called on by the United Nations to replace particular members of the peace-keeping staff at Headquarters who could in turn be deployed to a new mission. It is suggested that the professional nucleus of a field headquarters should be found principally from individual States involved, or lead nations. Sometimes a regional organization might provide the nucleus. Ideally personnel in staff positions should have received training in United Nations Headquarters procedures and be used to working in a multinational environment. The combination of trained personnel together with the continuity and expertise brought by deploying members of the planning and operations staff would help overcome the inherent disadvantages encountered when multinational headquarters are assembled in a mission area.

Communications and information

9. The United Nations needs to provide force commanders with considered political analysis based on accurate and up-to-date information about the situation on the ground. Such information is best performed by experts, often using specialized equipment. It would be prohibitively expensive for the United Nations to develop a viable in-house military information capability. The United Nations should therefore seek to make greater use of such capabilities that nations or multinational organizations already possess. Force commanders also need to be able to develop the capacity to analyse military information.

10. The United Nations needs to develop a system-wide communication system, so that strategic communications offer value for money and efficiency. A communications working party might examine how best to ensure that all United Nations parties (including agencies) engaged in operations are able to communicate effectively with each other. The key is to ensure common standards and compatibility.

11. The United Nations may wish to examine the need for coordinating mapping requirements and availability for operations and the appointment of a specialist mapping adviser as a member of the military staff.

Demining

12. The United Kingdom welcomes the appointment to the Secretariat of a mine clearance adviser. Coordination of all interested agencies is crucial.

Doctrine and standard operating procedures for peace-keeping

13. The fact that the United Nations draws its peace-keeping forces from many Member States is one of its greatest strengths since it means that United Nations peace-keeping missions are seen as an expression of concern by the international community as a whole and not as a means of promoting narrower national or regional interests. However, this political strength can be a source of military difficulties as forces from a variety of nations with different levels of expertise, operating to different standard operating procedures attempt to work together often for the first time.

14. The United Kingdom's experience as a member of a multinational alliance leads it to the firm view that the publication of United Nations tactical doctrine from which standard operating procedures could be elaborated would help to smooth the integration of a United Nations force. The United Nations might wish to draw on relevant existing standard operating procedures, for example, those developed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for a multinational environment.

15. Once developed, doctrine and standard operating procedures adapted to take account of current operations should be disseminated more widely among membership. Troop-contributing nations should fully understand these procedures and be competent in implementing them before deployment.

Training

16. Training should remain a national responsibility but structured to meet individual and unit standards set by the United Nations. The potential for staff colleges around the world to draw on a common body of knowledge in training their key officers should be considered. Experienced States should be willing to send personnel to participate in work of other staff colleges, and help them develop their own training programmes.

17. The United Nations might also examine the concept of experienced peace-keeping nations deploying small short-term training teams to train units from less experienced nations. Such training could be organized on a regional

basis and would be particularly valuable for contingents due to deploy to the same mission area.

18. There may be scope for a more limited United Nations training venture to allow for the training of personnel pre-designated to fill key appointments in field headquarters. Much of the training could be undertaken using distance learning techniques, possibly making use of national or regional staff colleges.

Political/military interface - cooperation with other agencies

19. It is important to develop understanding between the military and civilians, both within peace-keeping operations and with humanitarian and other involved agencies.

United Nations military observers/civilian observers

20. The United Nations faces a shortage of United Nations military observers. It could consider the potential for establishing also a core of United Nations civilian observers, who could be drawn from both those with diplomatic experience and ex-military who wish to serve the United Nations, who would act along the same lines as United Nations military observers and who could provide an additional analytical capacity to reinforce work of United Nations civilian advisers. The aim might be to deploy mixed teams, United Nations military observers and United Nations civilian observers, whose combined roles might contribute to local liaison and peacemaking, who work to the same doctrine in support of a force commander.

Logistics

21. The United Kingdom recognizes the need to enhance the United Nations logistic capability. A first step would be the creation of standard operating procedures for all areas of logistic support, including finance. The United Kingdom welcomes the Canadian-led United Nations exercise to draw up standard operating procedures, which has its full support. It is hoped that the results will prove implementable across the spectrum of peace-keeping operations.

22. There will be a need to follow up the creation and implementation of logistics doctrine and standard operating procedures with training of troop-contributors. A member State with expertise to offer might take the lead in drawing up a training package.

23. There is a possible case for drawing in civilian contractors by international tender where conditions on the ground permit and where this would be financially beneficial. There would be a clear need, however, to coordinate the overall logistic effort, including any civilianized elements.

24. There is a clear need for coordination of movement of assets and both in-theatre casualty evacuations and out-of-theatre medical evacuations.

25. Given pressures on United Nations international staff in the interim before developing a general staff concept, the United Nations might draw in more personnel recruited at the local level, who can fill gaps on short-term local

contracts. These can be specialists in logistics, administration, accountancy and so on.

Public information

26. The United Nations needs to adopt a more proactive approach to public information policy for peace-keeping operations. It should seek to draw in more professionals in handling the media, since every operation is subject to intense pressures. There is a need to train Headquarters and mission staff in management of media and in presenting the case for an operation and commenting on it as it progresses. The control of such information can no longer be done exclusively from New York. A more systematic flow of information between the United Nations and troop-contributing nations would be appreciated. The United Nations might seek to recruit specialists (or indeed ex-journalists) at local level to support missions.

27. Mission, mandates and aims need to be made clear to a host nation in advance. There is therefore a clear need for a major public information input from the time of a technical reconnaissance mission, to consider how the mandate and operation itself can best be portrayed to the host country and the local parties.

Administration and field finance

28. The United Nations needs to develop a highly professional and trained corps of chief administrative officers to cope with the massive needs of the current operations, while in keeping with the principle of unity of command report through the head of mission to the Department of Peace-keeping Operations in New York. Individual States might help with training to develop the best practice, a common understanding and esprit de corps. Some training for future operations can sometimes be provided by current large missions in theatre.

29. Procedures for recruitment of civilian staff, in particular short-term contract staff, should be streamlined. Contractors who regularly supply skilled labour to the United Nations should have briefing packages and be encouraged to develop their own training courses.

30. The United Kingdom accepts the case for a greater degree of delegated financial authority to chief administrative officers in any operation, but this would need to be matched by a system of regular inspection to establish that resources are being properly used. Military audit procedures have clear relevance to peace-keeping operations.

Equipment, costings and finance

31. The United Kingdom accepts that there may be an operational advantage in creating limited revolving stockpiles, possibly derived from underspending in current operations, to ensure that immediate emergency needs for deployment can be met. It is also aware, however, that costs would be incurred in storage maintenance, rotation and wastage through obsolescence. The financial implications of the above would need to be fully examined before this issue could be considered further.

32. The greater use of dormant contracts between the United Nations and commercial companies and nations for frequently used items should also be considered. Costs would need to be pre-negotiated and stocks subject to inspection.

33. The United Nations should consider applying to all troop-contributing nations a standard leasing arrangement for advanced military equipment as opposed to using a depreciation formula.

34. It might be worth exploring the possibilities for payment in kind by States who have appropriate and good condition military equipment up to a limited percentage of their assessed contributions, subject to inspection and verification and prior agreement on costings for individual items and a maintenance package.

35. Before passage of a resolution, the United Nations needs to present as fully costed an estimate of potential costs as possible, preferably a minimum of 48 hours in advance so that all Member States can consider the financial implications before a vote is taken.

36. The United Kingdom accepts in principle that from the moment of passage of a resolution, the United Nations Secretariat should send out assessment notices amounting to 20 per cent of estimated costs to meet immediate deployment needs. These would require potential costings to be available much sooner. It could also be helpful for these to be discussed in advance with, for example, the 15 major financial contributors. Pending responses, the Secretary-General should be entitled to draw on the peace-keeping reserve fund for starting costs.

37. However, this is only a short-term solution. In the longer term, there is no substitute for Member States' paying their assessed contributions promptly and in full. Member States, particularly persistent debtors, should continue to be urged at every opportunity to improve their payment record.

38. Enhancing the effectiveness of United Nations peace-keeping proposals, which of themselves would add to expenditure, should be financed by offsetting savings achieved through a reprioritization within the regular budget or a peace-keeping operations budget, whichever is appropriate.

Stand-by forces

39. The United Kingdom welcomes the initiation of the stand-by force planning project. For peace-keeping forces to be able to deploy rapidly and properly equipped for the task in hand, it is essential for the Secretary-General to have accurate information on forces Member States are prepared to make available. The verification process is important. An annual update and inspection of a percentage of units declared would seem appropriate. Alternatively, the United Nations could follow NATO practice in sending teams to interrogate States regularly (as with the NATO defence planning questionnaire). The United Kingdom welcomes the projected visit to NATO.

40. The United Kingdom maintains full-time, professional armed forces who undertake a variety of commitments world wide. The nature of these commitments makes it impossible for the United Kingdom to earmark forces solely for United

Nations service. It would not be possible to guarantee availability. Notwithstanding, the United Kingdom is prepared to consider further requests to commit forces to United Nations peace-keeping operations on a case-by-case basis taking account of resources already committed elsewhere.

41. The United Kingdom will therefore cooperate fully with the stand-by force planning team, which is due to visit the United Kingdom in the near future, by explaining the range of relevant command and operational capabilities it maintains, though any request for deployment would need to be considered on a case-by-case basis.

42. Nations contributing initial forces would wish to be certain that a commitment to deploy early was matched by a United Nations commitment to agree on a firm end date for their commitment. There may be merit in investigating further the concept of nations with well-trained, equipped and available forces providing the first wave of a peace-keeping force, thereby allowing other nations the time to train and equip their forces to the required standard.

43. The team might also look at logistic support, including strategic lift, that Member States might be able to put at United Nations disposal.

United Nations civilian police

44. United Nations civilian police play a key role in United Nations operations, but police forces differ widely in their training and practice. The United Nations might consider a stand-by planning exercise also to examine the availability, type and training of civilian police to assess what type of police force is most appropriate for a mission.

Role of regional organizations

45. The United Kingdom supports a greater role for regional organizations in peacemaking and potentially in peace-keeping. They have an intimate knowledge of local conditions and can provide expert knowledge on background to the conflict.

46. Consideration might therefore be given to enhancing and encouraging liaison with appropriate regional organizations.

47. The United Kingdom also sees some scope for the use of regional organizations to help with training for peace-keeping and possibly to conduct multinational exercises.

48. The United Kingdom supports the concept of a division of labour with regional organizations taking a greater role in their own areas particularly as regards peacemaking, while recognizing at all times the primacy of the United Nations in situations relating to international peace and security.

ANNEX

Some of the functions the planning and operations staff might include

(a) The preparation of advice for the Secretary-General on all aspects of United Nations peace support operations.

(b) The development of broad contingency plans and the maintenance of the stand-by force database.

(c) Making proposals on force requirements, command, control and communications, logistics, rules of engagement and training needs and standards.

(d) Liaising with nations and regional and other organizations, particularly in the areas covered by (b) and (c) above.

(e) Supporting special representative reconnaissance missions and developing military appreciations.

(f) Overseeing the implementation of policy established by the Security Council for United Nations operations.

(g) Provision of 24-hour support for current operations.

(h) Preparation of post-operation reports for the Security Council.

YUGOSLAVIA

[Original: English]

[26 August 1993]

1. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia supports the initiative and efforts to define the criteria and foundations of international relations and the appropriate role of the United Nations in the new conditions established in the post-cold-war period, particularly so the insistence of the Secretary-General to seek solutions to all problems and conflicts by peaceful means.

2. Considering that the central role and importance of the United Nations in all future processes of establishing, safeguarding and promoting world peace is widely recognized and accepted, it is quite understandable that the approach and basic orientations of the "Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277-S/24111) enjoy broad support among United Nations Member States, including that of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia did make its own contribution to the activities related to the preparations of the "Agenda", even though that contribution was often limited in size and scope owing to United Nations sanctions, short of which it would have been much more extensive and in line with what Yugoslavia had been ready and able to offer.

3. As one of the founding Member States of the United Nations, which participated in many peace missions under United Nations auspices throughout the history of the world Organization, Yugoslavia has been one of the staunchest adherents to the basic principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, such as peace, peaceful cooperation, confidence-building and the promotion of relations among States and respect for human rights aimed at furthering all-round prosperity.

4. There is no doubt that the new quality of international relations in the post-cold-war period, characterized by the desire for cooperation rather than confrontation, calls for appropriate structural, as well as conceptual adjustments of the United Nations, which should being about greater efficiency and appropriate responses to the challenges of the time to come. At the same time, the Member States themselves, including the largest, the most powerful and the most developed amongst them, should also adapt their own policies and views. In doing so, they should always bear in mind that the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations are the cornerstone on which all future United Nations activities should be based. For the United Nations has been entrusted with the most sacred of missions, the preservation of world peace and security, and it bears the primary responsibility for the discharge of this role in an effective, impartial and just way in accordance with international law. Consequently, the transformation of international institutions, primarily of the United Nations, in accordance with the new requirements, should be effected through multilateral forms of cooperation with equal participation by all its Member States. There is no doubt that the most appropriate forum for all these activities is the United Nations General Assembly.

5. It would be politically naive to disregard the weight and power of the world's most powerful States and their influence on the formulation of the future system of international relations. Therefore, future activities related

to the establishment of the system initiated by the "Agenda" must be carried out with a great deal of responsibility in the approach of all relevant factors, and of these countries in particular. If developments were to promote the interests of some countries or some groups of countries at the expense of the interests of others, the basic intentions proclaimed in the "Agenda" would be cancelled out.

6. The decisions adopted or to be adopted by the Security Council on the crisis in former Yugoslavia are eloquent proof that the questions dealt with in the "Agenda" deserve urgent attention and that they should be addressed without bias and partiality, which, unfortunately, has not been the case with regard to Yugoslavia.

7. At the outbreak of the Yugoslav crisis, the United Nations set up a peace protection force (UNPROFOR) with a specific task to protect the population until a durable political solution was reached. On the ground, UNPROFOR established effective cooperation with the European Community (EC) Monitor Mission. UNPROFOR's mandate was gradually expanded, both territory-wise (in addition to United Nations protected areas, it included former Bosnia-Herzegovina, Prevlaka and Macedonia) and assignment-wise, as a result of which the peace operations in the territory of the former Yugoslavia are now the largest, the most complex and the most expensive peace operation in the history of the United Nations. During its mission, resolutions were adopted authorizing the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter to ensure humanitarian aid deliveries and to impose safe havens in former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Close cooperation has been established between the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the implementation of the Security Council decisions on the no-fly zone in former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

8. Without a proper prior assessment of the situation, the Security Council adopted the resolutions, establishing unjust and unfair sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. By their severity and comprehensiveness these sanctions are without precedent in the history of the United Nations and punish an entire people. Particularly absurd is resolution 820 (1993), sealing off the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from the outside world, which - adding insult to injury - was adopted because Bosnian Serbs, citizens of another United Nations recognized State, had refused to accept the Vance-Owen Plan for former Bosnia-Herzegovina. The adoption of this resolution at that time was an exercise in sanctimony since the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had supported the Vance-Owen Plan as a framework of the quest for a durable and just peace, acceptable to all three warring parties in the civil war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina. The "unbearable lightness" of the international community in dealing with the crisis in the former Yugoslavia has been borne out by events: the Vance-Owen Plan has been all but abandoned, yet not only have the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia not been lifted, but their strict implementation continues to be insisted upon. Such inconsistency, even arbitrariness, in upholding the principles and purposes of the Charter are far from being contributory to the strengthening of world peace and security, much less to the adoption and affirmation of the "Agenda for Peace".

9. Against this backdrop, the experience of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in its cooperation with the United Nations in the context of the resolution of the crisis in the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is of great value for the future work of the United Nations in the

field of peace-keeping, its financing and personnel recruitment, but also as an example of dangerous precedents that have been made on behalf and under the authority of the world Organization.

10. In this context, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia feels called upon to make some remarks on some inadmissible tendencies in international relations that were particularly manifest in the process of resolving the Yugoslav crisis. Proceeding from Yugoslavia's lasting commitment to peace and the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, as well as from the experience gained in the resolution of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, a number of views on the "Agenda for Peace" are presented below.

11. The importance and role of the United Nations in establishing, safeguarding and promoting world peace and security are irreplaceable. The United Nations is and must continue to be the main effective and impartial centre of all activities aimed at establishing, safeguarding and protecting world peace and security.

12. The Security Council is the main executive organ of the United Nations, primarily responsible for ensuring peace and international security. This role of the Security Council was very much in evidence during the process of resolving the Yugoslav crisis. Unfortunately, some new and negative tendencies have also come to the fore.

13. During the adoption of relevant decisions in the Security Council, particularly those concerning the war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was a high level of agreement, especially among the permanent members of the Security Council, as a result of which decisions were, as a rule, adopted unanimously in contrast to the period of the cold war, a practice far from being negative by itself. This is, no doubt, an important new quality and a sign of the strengthened role of the Security Council. This tendency, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is convinced it shares the opinion of many other countries, is laudable only if the Security Council unanimity does not reflect the absolute supremacy and arbitrary role of some of its permanent members, to which other countries acquiesce tacitly or which they at least do not disapprove overtly, aware of their inability in the given constellation of forces to exercise decisive influence and thus modify or even prevent adoption of certain decisions.

14. With all this in mind and without prejudice to the importance of the Security Council and the universality of interests and the need to establish durable and stable peace, the processes initiated within the "Agenda" should include all those concerned, all United Nations Member States, in mapping out future solutions. The most appropriate form of their involvement is through their activity in the General Assembly, while the role of this main United Nations body should be considerably strengthened.

15. As a State that has contributed greatly to the formulation of the role of United Nations peace-keeping forces and other United Nations activities, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia does understand the importance of United Nations peace-keeping operations and its regular financing.

16. The experience of all United Nations peace-keeping missions, and particularly that acquired in civil wars, such as in former Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia, has proved that one of the priority roles of these missions is to provide humanitarian assistance. The special problem is to ensure the protection of United Nations forces. Considering the complexity of these issues, an efficient solution of the problem that would ensure a smooth running of United Nations activities, particularly those in which use of force is involved, must be sought on the basis of strict observance of the principles of the Charter and the relevant provisions of international law, and a carefully thought-out and worked-out concept, taking account of all relevant elements and specificities of the State and the region in question. The United Nations should therefore be involved in a country exclusively with the consent of the country concerned. This all the more so since the United Nations mandate is being ever more frequently extended to include questions falling traditionally within the competence of States themselves, while solutions are being increasingly sought through arrangements that include the use of force either by the United Nations or by resorting to military assistance outside the United Nations system, to which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has very strong objections.

17. A future international order that would be based on precedents, depart from, or even flagrantly violate, the basic principles of the Charter and international law, resort to double standards, as has been the unfortunate practice in dealing with the Yugoslav crisis, particularly evident in the international recognition of the forcible secession of the administrative parts of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the refusal to recognize the legality of the international continuity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as in the establishment of the unjust, unfair and almost racist sanctions against an entire nation, would not only be dangerous and lead to chaos, but would, no doubt, become a source of lasting tension, conflicts and threats to peace and security. The Yugoslav example provides abundant evidence in this regard.

18. This evidence is replete with ever more frequent and dangerous attempts to involve regional organizations outside the territories of their member States (EC, NATO, the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)) under the pretext of enlisting their cooperation with the United Nations in maintaining peace and security. This is done for the very obvious reason of accomplishing in this way special political, strategic and other goals and interests. Particularly unacceptable is the effort to use the United Nations as a smokescreen for achieving separate and essentially expansionist goals. It is the bounden duty of the United Nations to prevent these attempts. These issues must be given serious consideration also during their discussion within the preparation of the "Agenda", if we are to ensure the United Nations a new place and role in maintaining peace and security and promote progress and prosperity all over the world.

19. The experience acquired from the Yugoslav crisis reveals a new tendency, which, if continued, could have very serious repercussions for the future development of international relations. In point of fact, the United Nations and its Security Council resort must more easily today to the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter. In doing so, they depart ever more frequently from the basic principles of the Charter and from the spirit and norms of

international law or interpret them very broadly, sometimes even arbitrarily. The most striking example is the decision to establish an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia. It is obvious that a small number of countries had a decisive influence on the adoption of such a decision, whereby they sought to realize some of their specific interests by abusing the authority of the United Nations.

20. It is extremely dangerous if Security Council decisions are adopted hastily, if they are based on false accusations and are politically motivated, which, unfortunately, has often been the case in the process of dealing with the Yugoslav crisis.

21. Such precedents pay lip service to the credibility and authority of the world Organization, they are not conducive to confidence-building and cannot serve as a model for solving future conflicts. The unjust, unfair and extremely tough sanctions imposed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are tell-tale evidence of the unacceptable departure from the established principles of the Charter and the fundamental principles and norms of international law.

22. A glaring example of duplicity and double standard has been the denial of the right of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to participate in the activities of the United Nations and of other international bodies and organizations. Such a method of punishing a State, a full-fledged Member of the United Nations, which has no legal grounds in the Charter or in international law, is far from being suitable for solving international problems and conflicts. It is particularly unsuitable for dealing with a civil war like the one being waged in the territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

23. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia attaches absolute priority in its international relations to political means in solving all conflicts and disputes and, in this context, it highly appreciates and welcomes the efforts of the Secretary-General to bring about a peaceful settlement of some crises and conflicts. Special attention in the elaboration of the future United Nations activities within the "Agenda" should therefore be devoted to peaceful settlement of disputes and to preventive diplomacy. In this context, the International Court of Justice, whose role has been unjustly neglected, should be given added importance and its expert and unbiased advice should be sought and used much more often in the future.

24. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is of the opinion that force and coercive measures, sanctions in particular, under Chapter VII of the Charter should be resorted to only as a final option to be used only after the international community has exhausted all other means in the quest for a peaceful solution. Coercive measures, sanctions in particular, cannot solve an international conflict, especially not a civil war, and they have never been nor can they be an alternative to the settlement of problems and conflicts by peaceful and political means in accordance with the Charter. If the international community would nevertheless opt for coercive measures, this option must be based on the Charter and backed by relevant evidence and explanation. The procedure for the adoption of such a decision and the decision itself must leave no room for doubt as to whether the situation addressed by the Security Council justifies the adoption of the measures on the basis of

Chapter VII nor to question the motives of the Security Council in taking such a decision.

25. An exhaustive study of the measures taken against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under Chapter VII of the Charter, particularly of the effects of the sanctions on Yugoslavia, as well as on Yugoslavia's neighbours and other countries of the region, would certainly facilitate the discussion of the issues envisaged by the "Agenda". It would help put in proper perspective all the negative experience of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its neighbour States in dealing with United Nations sanctions, particularly their effects on the most vulnerable categories of the population - infants, children, the old and the ailing.

26. Looking back on all the experience Yugoslavia has had with the attempts of the international community to solve the Yugoslav crisis, especially with the harmful consequences of United Nations sanctions, it is proposed that sanctions should be imposed very selectively and only as a means of last resort and that they should be of limited duration.

27. Considering the very serious consequences of the sanctions for the overall socio-political life of the country on which they are imposed and of the countries affected by them indirectly, there is every justice in the request that special attention be accorded also to the establishment of mechanisms for rendering financial and other assistance to the countries affected by sanctions through no fault of their own.

28. The destructive and far-reaching negative consequences of present-day conflicts, especially of civil and inter-ethnic wars, increasing in number in recent years, point to the need that some of the issues dealt with in the "Agenda" related to the period following the cessation of a conflict be given special emphasis in future deliberations. In this context, in addition to the issues related to economic recovery and reconstruction, of special importance are humanitarian issues as well as the issues related to the protection of human rights.

29. In general and considering the principle of justice, peace and security, as well as the problem of the constellation of forces at every given moment, it is quite legitimate to ask whether sanctions should be mandatory or recommendable by nature, that is, whether they should be better left to the political will and assessment of individual Member States to decide for themselves on their implementation. The legitimacy of this issue is best illustrated in the case of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. There are quite a number of countries that consider that sanctions against Yugoslavia are too tough, unjust and unfair, but they have to implement them because of the decision of the Security Council.

30. The set of issues from the field of human rights and ensuring a consistent implementation of generally accepted standards must certainly be in the focus of interests and activity of the United Nations. However, it is unacceptable and absolutely inadmissible that this sensitive matter is used as a pretext for interference in internal affairs of sovereign States, particularly in cases of intervention. The sensitivity and complexity of this matter and in particular the specificity of every region and country, leave no room for any arbitrariness

and wilfulness. The responsibility of the United Nations in this field is enormous.

31. The activities of the United Nations must not be subordinated to the exclusive interests either of the countries that are the object of the activities or of those which, guided by their separate interests, may aspire to channel the activities of the United Nations in directions that correspond with their interests alone. Within the discussion of the issues dealt with in the "Agenda", special efforts should be made to establish a stable mechanism that would ensure an objective approach to and equality in rendering humanitarian assistance and would eliminate each and every bias of States that, as a rule, are principal donors. Needless to say, a consistent implementation of the principles of the Charter and of the relevant rules of international law must be the basis for undertaking any action under the auspices or through a mechanism of the United Nations.

32. In this context, a singular benchmark is the experience acquired in the Yugoslav crisis, in particular in the civil, inter-ethnic and religious war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina. It goes without saying that civil wars threaten the basic human rights of all, irrespective of national origin. Nobody is innocent in a civil war. This must, therefore, be the point of departure in rendering humanitarian assistance and in considering threats to human rights in war-affected areas. Punishing one side in a civil war alone cannot provide a sound basis for a lasting and just solution.

33. There is, therefore, hardly any justification for punishing a State that is not a party to a conflict, as has been the case with the imposition of sanctions only against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under an unfounded and absurd accusation that it has committed aggression against former Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is apparent also to key international factors, particularly those which initiated and forced their establishment.

34. In accordance with the principled position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the use of force and coercive measures, the sensitivity of issues related to "rapid intervention forces", to which the Secretary-General attaches great importance, is stressed. These complex issues call for a thorough elaboration to which all United Nations Member States should make a contribution since they are certainly most directly interested in laying out a clear framework in this regard.

35. In conclusion, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia pledges once again its readiness to make a full contribution to the elaboration of the "Agenda for Peace", as well as to all the activities of the United Nations and other international organizations in accordance with the principles and goals of the Charter of the United Nations and the basic principles and norms of international law.

II. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS

[Original: English]

[26 July 1993]

1. The United Nations is central to the maintenance of international security and order. The Secretary-General's proposals in his report "An Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277-S/24111) represent new thinking and an innovative approach towards strengthening this United Nations role, as spelt out in the Charter. It is a reflection of the changed global strategic conditions that the United Nations can now more effectively perform its preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building functions that play an essential part in conflict prevention and conflict resolution. However, new conflicts and problems have emerged at the regional and subregional levels, thereby resulting in increased demands on the United Nations.

2. In the Asia-Pacific region, the shifts in the global strategic balance have already led to adjustments in the policies of the major Powers as well as in those of the regional countries. In view of the present uncertainties, ASEAN has endeavoured to establish with the major Asia-Pacific countries mechanisms for continuous regional security dialogues and consultations to anticipate and resolve problems before they reach the crisis or conflict level. In this regard, ASEAN and the major Powers can complement some of the regional conflict-prevention and conflict-resolution roles of the United Nations in the Asia-Pacific. In South-East Asia, it was the efforts of the United Nations through the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) that led to the peaceful and successful outcome of the general elections in Cambodia in May 1993. ASEAN would like to see the United Nations continue with its regional role in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building. ASEAN also believes that the cause of international peace and stability will be strengthened by global economic dynamism and social development.

Preventive diplomacy

3. ASEAN endorses the Secretary-General's views on preventive diplomacy and, in particular, the proposals to develop the concept of preventive diplomacy through measures such as confidence-building, fact-finding and early warning. It is vital that potential conflicts be identified and limited before they erupt. ASEAN can play a role in regional preventive diplomacy in cooperation with the United Nations. The principle of preventive diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of disputes is enshrined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia.

4. ASEAN supports in principle confidence-building measures identified by the Secretary-General. ASEAN itself can be seen as a successful exercise in regional confidence-building. It has initiated broad concepts of regional confidence-building such as the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality and the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. The ASEAN Declaration on the South

China Sea is another example of regional confidence-building. ASEAN has also supported the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

5. ASEAN welcomes the adoption by consensus of General Assembly resolution 47/120 of 18 December 1992, which, inter alia, includes some important decisions on fact-finding. In endorsing the Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, as adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 46/59 on 9 December 1991, ASEAN notes that fact-finding missions undertaken by the Secretary-General, the Security Council or the Assembly would adhere to the guidelines adopted by the Assembly, in particular prior consent of the States involved. Article 99 of the Charter allows the Secretary-General to request the Security Council to consider and act on matters that may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security, and this can serve as an element of preventive diplomacy.

6. ASEAN agrees with many of the Secretary-General's proposals on early warning, namely, efforts to establish an effective early-warning mechanism and that regional organizations have an important role to play in early warning.

Peacemaking

7. ASEAN supports the Secretary-General's proposal for a greater role for the Security Council in the peaceful settlement of disputes, as indicated in Chapter VI of the Charter. The Council should remain the primary organ for the maintenance of international peace and security and resolving issues that have led to conflict. The General Assembly as a universal body should be utilized as appropriate in pre-empting or containing situations that threatened international peace and security. This has been demonstrated in ASEAN's experience with the Cambodian issue. Special representatives of the Secretary-General could also be appointed for specific regions/countries in order to enhance the knowledge of the United Nations and give forewarning of potential trouble spots. ASEAN also believes that, in cases of conflict, peacemaking could be facilitated by international action to ameliorate these circumstances. A more effective International Court of Justice would be desirable.

8. ASEAN is also of the view that, in drawing up sanctions regimes, the Security Council should take into account humanitarian considerations. In this regard, the Council should undertake a study on the effectiveness of various types of sanctions in achieving desired objectives.

9. ASEAN in principle supports the Secretary-General's advocation of the use of military force as a transition to United Nations enforcement actions when peaceful measures fail. With a view to improving peace-keeping operations, the experience of how UNTAC has worked out, both on the ground and at United Nations Headquarters, together with the possibility of setting up a United Nations force for peace-enforcement, could be further studied. There should be flexibility in assembling the forces since there are countries with constitutional constraints and problems of public opinion. The main bulk of the peace-enforcement units could come from those countries which are willing to offer forces.

Peace-keeping

10. ASEAN generally supports the Secretary-General's proposals on peace-keeping pertaining to financial and logistical issues. However, ASEAN believes that there is a need to make United Nations peace-keeping operations more cost-effective. ASEAN also urges all countries to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time. Personnel offered for peace-keeping activities must be highly competent, experienced and well-trained to cope with the increasingly challenging task of implementing and enforcing United Nations mandates. Training of personnel for peace-keeping operations should be based on agreed United Nations standards and concepts of operations.

Peace-building

11. ASEAN shares in the Secretary-General's belief that peace-building should be viewed as a counterpart to preventive diplomacy. Peace-building, especially in post-conflict situations, should address not only political problems of institutional and infrastructure development but also non-military threats to security such as the economic and social causes of instability.

Financing

12. ASEAN recognizes that a solid and stable financial foundation constitutes a vital precondition for the effective and efficient implementation of all United Nations programmes and activities. This is particularly true today when the Organization is confronted with increasing demands and challenges in particular in the area of peace-keeping operations. Currently, the United Nations is administering 14 peace-keeping operations in various regions of the world. This unprecedented increase in the number of peace-keeping operations undertaken by the United Nations since its inception is certainly stretching its scarce resources as the receipt of contributions has not kept pace with the cash requirements of each operation. This deplorable financial situation of the United Nations still remains and is simply due to the fact that a number of Member States fail to meet their statutory obligations under the Charter, which require them to pay their assessed contributions on time, both to the regular budget and to the peace-keeping operations. ASEAN therefore urges all the Member States to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time.

Conclusion

13. ASEAN welcomes and commends many of the proposals of the Secretary-General in his report "An Agenda for Peace". The Asia-Pacific region in the 1990s is in a healthy state, its countries are at peace both internally and with each other. Major international changes that have occurred after the end of the cold war have generated some uncertainties but also provided an historic opportunity for international cooperation to strengthen the prospects for global peace and prosperity. The world community has an obligation to act in order to save future generations from the scourge of war. The Secretary-General's proposals as contained in "An Agenda for Peace" are important steps towards international peace and stability. In enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security, one cannot ignore the urgent need for a comprehensive and integrated approach towards peace, development and democracy. The time has come for the United Nations to move

beyond recognizing that peace and prosperity are interrelated, and to adopt concrete measures and programmes of action.

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

[For the full text, see document S/25996/Add.2.]

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Improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping

Report of the Secretary-General

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Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

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I. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM MEMBER STATES

New Zealand 2

NEW ZEALAND

[Original: English]

[3 September 1993]

1. The Government of New Zealand welcomes the request of the Secretary-General of 11 June 1993 for views on enhancing the capacity of the United Nations in respect of its peace-keeping operations and fully supports the 28 May 1993 statement of the Security Council (S/25859) that gave rise to the Secretary-General's request. The Secretary-General's request is a timely one, as the Organization looks for new ways of meeting current and future peace-keeping challenges.

2. The United Nations first priority should be to improve its capacity to plan, command and conduct multinational peace-keeping operations, including those mandated to have recourse to force under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

3. In particular New Zealand stresses the importance of:

(a) The Security Council defining precisely the mandate of each operation, with clear political objectives;

(b) The translation of the mandate into clearly defined operational objectives, including time-frames where appropriate;

(c) Regular assessments of existing operations, including reviewing the scope of their termination;

(d) Such assessments to review operational plans to ensure that action on the ground remains linked to the ongoing political process and that mandates and plans do not become decoupled as the situation evolves;

(e) Host Governments living up to their obligations to ensure safety of and respect for the status of United Nations peace-keeping personnel, and persons who attack peace-keepers being held to account for their actions;

(f) Where required, defining more clearly the right to self-defence, and the use of appropriate force, to assure the safety of United Nations personnel, together with the incorporation of these aspects in mandate and planning development;

(g) Regular briefings being provided in New York to troop-contributing countries on the conduct of operations.

4. Peace-keeping is an activity in which all Member States have a role to play. New Zealand regrets the failure on the part of some States to meet obligations in respect of peace-keeping operations, whether because of tardy financial contributions or through lack of cooperation with a United Nations force.

5. New Zealand also maintains that a special onus is placed upon the permanent members of the Security Council to set an example in all aspects of peace-keeping, including willingness to contribute significant forces under United Nations command and control, and to pay promptly and in full their assessed financial contributions.

6. With the proliferation of the challenges to global stability and security, it can be assumed that demands on the Security Council for more forceful action will continue to grow. In this, the guiding principles are those of Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. In the main, operations are carried out by forces directly under the control of the Secretary-General, and authorized by the Security Council. In some circumstances, action has involved national forces, regional organizations or purpose-formed coalitions authorized by the Security Council. Beyond the need to define carefully the command and control relationships between such forces and the United Nations, the degree to which these groupings offer practised command, control and operational synergies to the United Nations should not be overlooked.

I. SECRETARIAT STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

7. New Zealand has long argued for a more integrated peace-keeping structure. It therefore strongly endorses the recent steps taken by the Secretary-General towards the restructuring of those parts of the Secretariat involved in United Nations peace-keeping operations, including the establishment of a Department of Peace-keeping Operations and a Situation Room, as well as an enhanced peace-keeping planning staff.

8. In terms of the Secretariat structure, New Zealand:

(a) Supports the development of a corps of Professional staff, funded through regular United Nations arrangements;

(b) Recognizes that for some time yet, the Secretary-General will need specialist staff seconded from Member States. New Zealand has provided such assistance in the past, and stands ready to make staff available to the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, including the Situation Room, and to the Office of the Military Adviser as appropriate;

(c) Subject to relevant procedures, endorses the evolving practice of the United Nations contracting out for the supply of certain specialist personnel, equipment and services such as aircraft, as relevant and cost-effective in certain circumstances;

(d) Believes that in addition to relying on personnel and services supplied by the Government of a Member State, the United Nations must also be able to draw on appropriate non-governmental sources.

9. With regard to the implementation of the Council's mandates, New Zealand believes the Secretary-General, under the overall guidance of the Security Council, should provide:

(a) Strategic direction to special representatives and force commanders;

(b) Clear lines of political direction and operational command and management at all levels, ensuring unity both within United Nations Headquarters and in the field;

(c) Around-the-clock monitoring of operations and timely responses, and coordination of logistic/military requirements of theatre commanders.

10. The Secretariat should be responsible for:

(a) Coordinating and disseminating in a timely way inputs from national information sources;

(b) Preparing and maintaining outline contingency plans for United Nations missions;

(c) Developing and promulgating common operational staff procedures, standard operating procedures, rules of engagement and logistic doctrine;

(d) Developing standardized command and control policies, including definitions;

(e) Undertaking post-operation assessments, acting as a repository for the collective experience of all aspects of United Nations operations and providing advice or recommendations for current or future operations;

(f) Coordinating and liaising with troop- and equipment-contributing States.

II. PLANNING, MOUNTING AND CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

11. In the planning phase, in which the role of key United Nations Headquarters staff is central, it is important that:

(a) The force commander and his key staff should be identified and appointed at an early stage;

(b) They should also participate in operational reconnaissance prior to the conduct of planning;

(c) The broad operational plan is developed by United Nations Headquarters staff in close consultation with the force commander, within the strategic directives and guidance flowing from the mandate;

(d) The force commander, having been given clear objectives and working within the framework of a broad operational plan, should assume primary responsibility for developing detailed operational and logistic plans, with support as needed from the Department of Peace-keeping Operations;

(e) To facilitate planning, a range of accurate and timely information should be available, especially to match capabilities and equipment to the perceived risk.

12. Mounting an operation requires a continuity of planning and execution, involving United Nations Headquarters planning staff, and the early forging of an operational Headquarters staff. In particular:

(a) Realistic command post exercises keyed to the operation would be useful in confirming planning, doctrinal, logistic and equipment requirements, and chains of command;

(b) Such exercises would also facilitate the correction of any omissions in and the refinements of standard procedures;

(c) Where possible, national contingent commanders and their staff should work up with the operational headquarters;

(d) Where practicable, contingents should undergo a period of predeployment training to enhance integration with the combined operational structure. This could take place in home locations or in the theatre. However, prior attendance of key national contingent staff at the operational headquarters work-up would contribute significantly to more relevant predeployment training and subsequent integration.

13. The good conduct of a peace-keeping operation depends on command, control, communications and information. New Zealand therefore stresses that:

(a) It is the task of the Secretary-General to clarify and reinforce the necessary coordination of military with other operation objectives;

(b) Within the bounds of appropriate levels of control by United Nations Headquarters and any special representative, the force commander should have the flexibility to adjust operational plans or make decisions to meet military imperatives on the ground;

(c) Operational control of all military forces should rest with a single operational-level commander;

(d) Personnel deployed should be professionally competent. The force commander should be provided with avenues to correct or recommend the removal of unsatisfactory performers. Contributing States have an onus to ensure staff selected measure up to United Nations standards;

(e) Forces need common rules of engagement, staff procedures and standard operating procedures, drawn from a United Nations doctrine. Development of such a doctrine is a major priority and could come from an examination of procedures already developed within existing alliances;

(f) Satisfactory arrangements are agreed between contributing States and the United Nations that allow the force commander to exercise the necessary operational authority while taking into account national command considerations;

(g) Rapid and unimpeded communications are essential and may require the use of secure means when the disclosure of United Nations intentions might place troops at risk. Force commanders also need to be able to collect, analyse and

disseminate military information locally and to assimilate this in a timely manner with political and military information from United Nations Headquarters;

(h) Force commanders and United Nations representatives in the field must also be conscious of the requirement that relevant political and military information be communicated rapidly to United Nations Headquarters for briefing of the Security Council and troop-contributing countries.

III. AVAILABILITY OF FORCES

14. To react quickly, the United Nations requires rapid access to updated information on potential contributions and their likely availability from Member States. It must therefore develop and manage an appropriate database.

15. New Zealand has routinely provided the Secretary-General with information on personnel and equipment it might in principle make available at short notice. Accordingly:

(a) It welcomes the establishment of a Stand-by Forces Study Team and the forthcoming visit of this team. This project is valuable in aiding national planning, promoting more rapid deployment and ensuring proper equipping of contingents;

(b) It would also welcome the further examination by the Team of the merits of quick start/short duration stand-by units and their expeditious replacement by longer-term contingents;

(c) With a small defence force and other commitments, New Zealand has made, and will continue to make, contributions on a case-by-case basis.

IV. LIMITED REVOLVING RESERVE OF EQUIPMENT

16. New Zealand took note of the proposal made in the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations for the establishment of a reserve stock of equipment as a buffer to be drawn on for new and ongoing operations and subsequently replenished (A/48/173, paras. 13 and 59):

(a) It looks to the Secretary-General to advise on the cost-effectiveness of holding stocks, in the light of factors such as storage and transportation costs, obsolescence and compatibility (between forces, as well as operation-by-operation);

(b) The United Nations should also review its database of equipment that Member States could make available at short notice for a peace-keeping operation.

V. TRAINING AND STANDARDIZATION OF PROCEDURES

17. Effective and focused training is the key to a successful operation. At its heart is proper preparation at the national level. The responsibility for developing and implementing the required standards falls on both the Secretariat and participating States. The Secretariat's role is, as a matter of priority, to prepare and promulgate common doctrines and procedures (both military and civilian), and training materials and programmes for national trainers. Force commanders must be involved at an early stage in the process of determining relevant training requirements for an operation. Member States need to incorporate these guidelines into national training programmes as appropriate and to undertake operation-specific training prior to deployment.

18. New Zealand:

(a) Sees scope for more cooperation between Member States in regional training programmes and is already exploring these possibilities;

(b) Notes proposals for multinational peace-keeping exercises, but believes that this level of training should be considered at a later stage, once national and regional programmes are in place;

(c) Supports the development by the Secretariat of training guidelines, performance standards, standardized curricula and training fellowships as recommended at the 1993 session of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations;

(d) Also supports the provision of further in-theatre training, should the operation require it.

VI. SAFETY OF PERSONNEL

19. New Zealand proposals to the Security Council in March led to the adoption of a statement calling for an early report by the Secretary-General on the adequacy of current arrangements for the protection of United Nations forces and personnel and with appropriate recommendations to enhance the safety of United Nations personnel. Subsequently, New Zealand submitted a paper to the Secretary-General that supported a range of measures being elaborated in relevant United Nations bodies.

20. There is an urgent need to focus specific attention on the question of responsibility for attacks on United Nations personnel and the consequential question of measures to ensure that those who carry out such attacks are brought to speedy trial under an appropriate legal regime. The United Nations should have the means, where necessary, to hold such individuals personally responsible. International law relating to the protection of United Nations forces should be no less effective than the rules protecting combatant forces. There is a clear need for the innovative development of international law in these areas.

21. New Zealand has accordingly proposed that:

(a) The Security Council pay particular attention to the safety of personnel issues when establishing mandates for peace-keeping operations. In principle, no troops should be deployed without undertakings from all parties to a conflict that the safety of United Nations personnel will be assured;

(b) An item relating to the safety of United Nations personnel be inscribed on the agenda of the forthcoming session of the General Assembly;

(c) Work should begin on the elaboration of a new legal convention to fill gaps in existing international law.

VII. NON-MILITARY ELEMENTS

22. Military components of peace-keeping need to be more fully integrated with associated social and economic activities of the United Nations. The inclusion of civilian components as part of United Nations military operations is now seen as essential; but there are wider issues to be addressed. If military action is to be avoided, and if peace-keeping operations are to be successful over the longer term, then peace-keeping - especially preventive diplomacy and peace-building - must be about economic and social responses, as well as about military activity. Resources need to be directed towards developing these two phases of the international community's involvement as well as towards peace-keeping and peacemaking.

23. But beyond the operations themselves, the time has come for a closer examination of how the United Nations should organize its involvement once the primary peace-keeping phase has concluded:

(a) At that time, in a phase distinct from military involvement, it would be appropriate to consider mechanisms for the establishment for a "partnership arrangement" between the United Nations and local people in the task of rebuilding a nation that would contribute materially to problem-solving and conflict resolution;

(b) Under such an arrangement, with input from all parts of the United Nations system, the rebuilding phase could be centred on a single coordinating body at United Nations Headquarters.

24. New Zealand regards the integrated peace-keeping operations that have been a feature of recent operations as entirely appropriate. It has contributed police and civilian personnel to a number of such operations. In its view:

(a) Training programmes should include the military and non-military elements of operations;

(b) Lines of coordination and command between the non-military elements of peace-keeping operations (humanitarian, political, legal, police and administrative) and the military components must ensure that respective mission activities are coherent and internally supportive.

VIII. INFORMATION ACQUISITION

25. New Zealand supports measures by the Secretary-General aimed at improving the quality and timeliness of information germane to the good conduct of a peace-keeping operation:

(a) The establishment of regional divisions and a Policy and Analysis Unit within the Department of Peace-keeping Operations is a welcome first step;

(b) The United Nations also needs to enhance its secure systems to facilitate the acquisition of a more comprehensive range of information central to the conduct and security of an operation.

IX. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

26. The Government of New Zealand supports a greater role for regional organizations in peacemaking and conflict prevention. Their knowledge of local conditions is an asset on which the United Nations can and should draw. The report of the Secretary-General that addresses views of a number of regional organizations (S/25996) is a useful start. A broader range of response would clearly assist the Secretary-General in formulating recommendations for his September report.

X. FINANCIAL MATTERS

27. The resolution of budgetary problems is the crux issue. The burden of peace-keeping today is such that the onus is on all Member States to meet assessed contributions in full and on time. Otherwise, the system stands to collapse:

(a) Penalties for late or non-payment, as have been mooted by the Secretary-General, merit fuller consideration;

(b) Payments of peace-keeping assessments on time would obviate the need for a peace-keeping reserve fund beyond existing levels. It would also enable the Organization as a whole better to manage its regular budget;

(c) New Zealand fully supports the maintenance of a peace-keeping reserve fund at around $150 million. While noting proposals for its increase to around $400 million, it believes a larger fund would not be necessary if the level of on-time payments were raised substantially. It should not be for those countries which meet their dues to provide a long-term peace-keeping subsidy for the late payers;

(d) New Zealand sees merit in the development of a unified peace budget and single annual assessment to cover the recurrent costs of ongoing peace-keeping missions, and including a small margin for new and unexpected missions. To uphold consistency with the periodic reviews of mandates by the Security Council, the latter element should not be drawn upon without prior approval of the Council and a normal appropriation. This approach would facilitate a better cash flow forecasting both by Member States and the Organization itself;

(e) New Zealand fully supports the proposal for the Secretary-General to obligate up to 20 per cent of estimated costs of an operation. Indeed, it has already put on record its preparedness for a higher figure, of one third, as recommended by the Secretary-General;

(f) Greater financial authority could be passed to the special representative and force commander/chief military observer of an operation. Suitable financial control arrangements could be strengthened through the appointment of an Inspector-General.

28. While recognizing that the scale of assessments for peace-keeping operations is a matter that demands careful examination and is related to exercise on budgetary reform that go beyond the scope of this paper, New Zealand sees considerable merit in the conclusions of the Ford Foundation study on "Financing an Effective United Nations", in particular, New Zealand would welcome further discussion on the study's recommendation that a greater number of above average per capita GNP countries should pay the same percentage for peace-keeping assessments as for the regular budget.

XI. PUBLIC INFORMATION

29. Recent developments have pointed clearly to the need for the United Nations to boost the dissemination of information about its peace-keeping activities:

(a) In the immediate term, there is a responsibility - which a host country shares - to ensure that the purposes of a peace-keeping mission are fully explained to affected civilians. Developing support among and within directly affected States is, as the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations concluded this year, of tremendous importance (A/48/173, paras. 34 and 106);

(b) So too is the dissemination of information more widely, to troop-contributing countries and to other interested parties as well as the public at large. New Zealand believes that the United Nations already has the capacity to develop its information systems for peace-keeping, without major additional financial input;

(c) An early task of the new Policy and Analysis Unit of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations should be to develop more focused information dissemination systems, appropriately targeted, both within the Secretariat and in the field.